There is not a close a
enough link between the professions of philosophy and counselling. Most
counsellors ignore philosophy. For example Egan (1975) recommends a curriculum
of ten subjects for trainee counsellors which neglects philosophy altogether.
Similarly the insular academic philosophical world does not take much interest
in psychotherapy. For example when the current writer had an article published
in the magazine Philosophy Now (LeBon, 1994) the editor of the magazine
wrote "Tim LeBon .. is training to be an existential psychotherapist, whatever
that is" (my italics). This essay will argue that counsellors should
be more philosophically aware. I will first argue that those concerned with
counselling theory ( i.e. the attempt to explain and justify various
counselling approaches ) need to use the philosophy of mind and ethics. I will
then go on to examine the more contentious view that philosophy also has a
place in the counselling session itself.
Philosophy and the theory of
counselling
Those who try to appraise
counselling theories should undoubtedly be philosophically literate. Every
approach to counselling is based on some philosophical assumptions - only more
often than not these are left implicit and unexamined. Existentialism depends
partly on phenomenology, which is just one answer to the problems of perception
and subject-object relationship. Psychoanalysis assumes determinism, which is
just one stance in the age-old philosophical problem of free will.
Cognitive-behavioural approaches advocate hedonism, the debatable view that
pleasure is the only thing of value. Heaton (1990:4) recognises that philosophy
has a role to play when he says "Philosophy can be on the sidelines
criticising its concepts" but rather throws the point away. I would want
to argue that this role is far more important than is usually recognised.
Two examples, from the
philosophy of mind and ethics, will demonstrate how counselling theory can go
wrong by being philosophically naive. My first example is how philosophy is
used by Sartre to refute the Freudian notion of repression. Repression is
supposed to be a useful explanatory concept, especially in connection with
self-deception. Initially we are puzzled because when we deceive ourselves we
know X but in another sense we believe X to be false. Repression is meant to
explain this by positing the existence of a censor which decides that something
is too painful for the ego to bear, and so represses it. In Chapter 2 of Being
and Nothingness Sartre (1956) points out the infinite regress that is
involved in Freud's concept of self-deception. For in repression the censor
itself ( rather than the person) must be aware of what is to be repressed and
what is conscious. Hence Freud's solution only moves the problem one step
further back and in no way is the explanation of self-deception it may appear
to be.
My second example of the
need for philosophical awareness in counselling theory comes from ethics. Many humanistic
therapists encourage clients to aim for self-actualisation and to avoid
"oughts" and "musts". Yet any first-year ethics student
will be aware that morality - i.e. that which insists on "oughts" and
"musts" - is a necessary check on the individual's selfish urges.
Taking the view of an ideal observer of the whole of society, morality ensures
that the general welfare is enhanced by the following of rules which may seem
to be against individual's short-term interests. This is not to say that all forms
of morality are good, nor that any individual will always benefit from being
moral - my point is that if people ignore "oughts" and aim only to
achieve their own self-fulfilment they will inevitably harm other people, and
possibly themselves in the long-run. This is exactly the point van
Deurzen-Smith (1988,14-19) makes in criticising such counselling approaches.
She cites the case of Frances who, encouraged by a personal-growth group,
abandoned her family responsibilities to try to fulfil herself - only to find
that the implications of breaking the commitment of marriage were more serious
than she realised and "that the ensuing chaos ( when one abandons moral
rules) was not attractive at all". A basic awareness of the philosophical
relevance of morality would have prevented humanistic theorists taking such a
simplistic approach ( though to be fair such an approach is usually coupled
with an equally naive faith in human nature which if correct would make
morality matter less).
In view of the fact that their client's well-being is of such central importance, it is incredible how little attention is paid to ethics. Counsellors are of course aware that there are ethical implications of their work, but tend to focus on small details (like whether counsellors should keep records of sessions) rather than the more fundamental question of what is happening to the well-being of their client. What is required is more work like that of Holmes and Lindley (1989). They take a broadly utilitarian stance and argue that psychotherapy can be justified in that it increases the autonomy of the client. By turning id into ego and enhancing self-knowledge and self-awareness, therapy enables the client to take control of their life. Increasing public awareness and debate about counselling makes it vital that other theorists enter the public domain to defend the efficacy of their particular approach.
Philosophy and the practice of
counselling
The opponents of philosophy have
to admit, I think, that philosophy is of use in assessing the theory of
counselling, but they may still argue that it is the antithesis of what is
required in counselling practice. Surely, they will say, counselling is about
being warm and practical - whereas philosophers are notoriously impractical and
academic and therefore out of touch with the requirements of a troubled,
non-academic client. I will now argue, against this, that in fact there are two
distinct ways in which counselling can be a sort of philosophy. These two
different ways correspond to the two approaches to philosophy noted by Purton
(1993). The first approach to philosophy tries to establish positive
conclusions, for example about how to live, whereas the other merely attempts
to clarify and question.
(i) Philosophy's attempt to
provide knowledge used in counselling
The first way that philosophers
can contribute is through providing answers to questions relating to the goals
of therapy - for example "What is the good life ?" and "How can
meaning in life be enhanced ?" Throughout the ages philosophers of various
schools have attempted answers to these questions, most notably perhaps the
existentialists and utilitarians. Existentialists think that authenticity is
important and that people should acknowledge the givens of life - such as the
facts that they must create their own meaning, that they are free and that they
will die. Hence a certain way of being is advocated - a way of living which is
consistent with the values of existentialism. van Deurzen-Smith (1994:20)
argues for this sort of use of philosophy in counselling when she says that
that counselling is applied philosophy, and counsellors should
"investigate and rigorously apply the laws of existence." Conversely
utilitarians think that the good life is one that maximises happiness. Hence a
utilitarian therapist would encourage clients to examine the consequences of
their actions, to look at alternatives, and to be aware of what it is that
makes them happy.
Both the existential and
utilitarian answers to the "good life" are attractive. However we
must be wary as counsellors in using philosophical "knowledge" of
this sort too liberally. That I have presented two equally plausible, yet
conflicting, accounts of the "good life" should set us on our guard.
The problem is that though philosophy may try to establish a body of knowledge,
it rarely does so to everyone's satisfaction. Whilst scientists may agree that
penicillin cures infections, not all philosophers agree about what is the good
life. Nor will they ever, for we are talking about ultimate ends, and because
they are ultimate it is impossible to justify them in terms of anything
else. So one man may prefer happiness, another authenticity, and nothing anyone
can do will prove either wrong. The upshot is that counsellors should not use
their philosophical "knowledge" as if it was objective, scientific
fact. An alternative is to be very explicit to clients about one's values - so
an existential therapist would offer therapy to people and tell them that they
offered the client the chance to be more authentic, whereas a
cognitive-behaviourist therapist ( perhaps) might tell the client they are
there to enhance the client's happiness. As long as this happens then a
philosophically-inspired counsellor is in a similar position to a Christian
counsellor - values have been agreed between the client and counsellor, and the
object is to make the clients life live up to these values. So whilst
philosophy of this first sort can be of use, counsellors have to be wary of
preaching dogma to the unconverted but easily-influenced client, be it derived
from philosophical reflection or religious revelation.
(ii) The philosophical approach
applied to a client's life
There is another, perhaps less controversial
way to bring a sort of philosophy into the counselling session. Philosophy is
about clarifying, questioning and exploring. Although it has tended to be
applied to "big" questions like the meaning of life, there is in fact
no limit as to its subject matter. Now suppose we apply philosophy to a
client's life. Counsellors can facilitate the clarification of the client's
world, the questioning of their assumptions and the exploration of the
alternatives they face. This is philosophy in the second of Purton's senses -
what Wittgenstein calls "a working on oneself. On one's own
interpretations. On one's way of seeing things ... it unties the knots in our
thinking" ( 1980:16 ). In this way philosophy can contribute towards the
client leading "the examined life".
I can give an example from my own
therapy about how this sort of counselling can be beneficial. For a long time I
was really quite anxious about my future career. I had this definite feeling
that I wanted to leave computing, and also that I wanted to get into
counselling. Yet I needed to stay in computing to earn money. My counsellor was
able to lay before me the assumptions I was making. viz. :-
[1] I want to go into counselling.
[2] I want to leave computing.
[3] I need money.
[4] I cannot go into counselling
without leaving computing completely.
Step 4 is the unwarranted step
that led to my anxiety. My counsellor simply checked whether it was a valid
assumption that there had to be such a black and white choice. I immediately
realised that there was the option of pursing both careers for quite a while
and consequently much of my anxiety ceased and a constructive plan was evolved.
Warbuton (1992:4) compares an individual's use of philosophy in this way with
servicing a car. To carry on living without checking one's assumptions is like
driving a car without getting it serviced. This can apply not only to factual
assumptions like the ones given earlier but also to examining one's values,
one's options in life, one's actions and how they all fit together. In therapy
the client's values can be made explicit and examined and used as the basis for
assessing alternatives facing the client. There is not space here to develop
the idea further, but hopefully enough has been said to establish that there is
much promise in this approach.
Having made the case for such a
philosophical approach to counselling, some limitations must be acknowledged.
How effective it will be in specific cases depends on several factors, such as
how willing and able the client is to look at their life. How successful it is
in general depends on which model of the person is the more accurate. The
greater the extent that Freud or the behaviourists are right the more limited
use it will be. For if action is caused by unconscious motivation or learned
behaviour then examining one's life in a rational way is not going to be so
effective.
It would also be wrong to suggest
that this approach is completely value-free. Socrates said "the unexamined
life is not worth living" (Plato, 1969:72) but this statement itself is
more often quoted than examined. Why exactly shouldn't one live a carefree,
unreflective life ? Warbuton's analogy of a car being serviced is not entirely
valid. A serviced car functions better ( usually !) but in what way does a
counselled person function better ? There are two criticisms lurking here, one
empirical and the other philosophical. Examining one's life in counselling may
benefit the client in a number of ways, but one can imagine cases where it
could be counter-productive. For example there is some research that suggests
that the happiest people may be those who are a little deluded and
overoptimistic (Argylle, 1987) and so not those who have examined their lives
most carefully. The lesson to be learnt from this objection is that reflecting
on life should not be done purely for its own sake but rather to promote the
client's well-being. The philosophical objection is harder to repel. For it can
be suggested that getting the client to lead the examined life faces the same
risk as the existentialist or utilitarian counsellor discussed above. It is
tempting to argue that full respect is paid to the client because one is
getting them to work on their own values and assumptions. Though this
may be a lesser imposition than if one suggests they should, for example,
pursue pleasure, the implied values of this approach - for example
self-reflection, consistency, clarity and self-knowledge - are qualities not
valued by all cultures, individuals or, for that matter, clients.
Finally I cannot claim that this
approach to counselling is entirely novel. Aspects of it are of course implicit
in both the existential and the cognitive-behavioural approaches. What I have
stressed is that this approach is primarily philosophical and that there is a
way of counselling that is philosophical without it necessarily being
existential or cognitive. There is a more basic way in which counsellors can
use philosophy without having to agree with Heidegger or John Stuart Mill.
Conclusions
To conclude, philosophy is
certainly an undervalued resource for the counsellor. Its analysis of concepts
is critically important in the theory of counselling. In counselling practice,
philosophical theories about the good life and other goals of therapy can be
used, with caution, as part of the counsellor's body of knowledge. More
generally, a philosophical approach to a client's life can be commended as a
means to the client leading a more examined life. Ironically, philosophy in its
role on the sidelines criticising counselling can be used against philosophy
when it is brought into the counselling session itself. As counsellors faced
with the necessary task of helping the many clients in distress we must
navigate the rocky path between van Deurzen Smith's worthy plea for counsellors
to "seriously investigat[e] what life is about and what people can do to
live it better" [1994:16] and Wittgenstein's cautionary dictum that
"What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence" [1921:6.53].
References
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Psychology of Happiness Routledge
Deurzen-Smith , E. van (1994) Can
Counselling Help School Of Education, University of Durham
Deurzen-Smith , E. van (1988) Existential
Counselling In Practice Sage
Deurzen-Smith , E. van (1990) Existential
Therapy in Individual Therapy ed. Dryden (Oxford University Press)
Egan, G (1975) The Skilled
Helper Brooks/Cole
Heaton, J (1990 )What is
Existential Analysis ? Journal of the Society for Existential Analysis 1:
2-6
Holmes, J & Lindley, R (1989) The
Values of Psychotherapy Oxford University Press
LeBon, T (1994) The Existential
Greyhound ( or how Jean-Paul Sartre goes to the White City and loses all his
money) Philosophy Now 9
Plato (1969) The Apology
Penguin Classics
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Sartre, J.P. (1956) Being and
Nothingness New York
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- The Basics Routledge
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Paul, London 1961)
Wittgenstein, L (1980) Culture and Value Oxford Blackwell
©Tim LeBon